Intra-dependency

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Revision as of 13:14, 13 January 2025 by Saskia (talk | contribs)

Intra-dependency calls into question "the very nature of two-ness, and ultimately one-ness as well. “Between” will never be the same. One is too few, two is too many.” (Barad, 2010, p. 251)

When the world is understood as consisting of entities (whether material, or immaterial, plant or mineral) that are not pre-determinately fixed as clearly bounded, individual “things”, but that rather emerge as phenomena in a constant state of becoming and co-shaping each other while doing so, those entities can no longer be considered as “inter” dependent parts to a whole, but rather as “intra” dependent relationships that are themselves generative of “wholeness”.

Such wholeness no longer separates subjects (meaning-makers) from objects (observable phenomena), but considers them as co-constitutive. Karen Barad asserts that: ‘Matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder’…

You are stopped in your tracks, you sense some trouble here. Such "intra-dependency" as put forward here, citing Karen Barad, gestures towards an ontological turn within western philosophy, that seemingly holds a lot of similarities with Indigenous, monist ontologies. How does this hold up against the principle of respecting difference that you encountered earlier?

Stay with the trouble: Ethics of response-ability